Twentieth century Korean history is particularly significant, the retired general said. Until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, China dominated Korea for centuries, with Japan making occasional incursions into the peninsula and Manchuria. The small peninsula of Korea, Singlaub remarked, is at the "vortex of the Pacific powers." Korea has a common border with China and (often forgotten, the general noted) Russia. Access to the Pacific is blocked by Japan. The U.S., Great Britain and the Continental European powers have also had increasing interests in the region since the nineteenth century, he added.

Having neutralized China, the Japanese Empire then turned to its other regional rival, Tsarist Russia, [thus starting the Russo-Japanese War] in 1904. Japan disregarded sovereignty or neutrality, Singlaub noted, and used Korean territory to successfully attack the Russians’ softly defended rear positions at Port Arthur. Combining more modern ships and superior seamanship, the general continued, the Japanese dispersed the Russian fleet, which included a contingent of warships sent from the Baltic Sea.

By 1910 Japan declared Korea a colony and annexed Chinese Manchuria in 1932. Also adding other nations in the region as vassal states, a significant portion of Asia was thus under Japanese control when WWII started, said Singlaub. The Japanese then "completely dominated" the Korean subject population from 1910-1945. They had to adopt Japanese names and the official language became Japanese.

The USSR declared war on Japan on [Aug. 9 1945], Singlaub went on, the day the second atomic bomb was dropped [on Nagasaki, Japan]. Soviet forces quickly pushed into Manchuria and occupied northern Korea. The Allies then created a demarcation line at the 38^th parallel. North of that border, Singlaub added, the Soviets were charged with disarming and repatriating the Japanese. The other Allies [mainly the U.S.] were expected to perform similar duties in the south.

Red Army troops were surprised at the comparatively high standard of living enjoyed by ordinary Manchurian and Korean people, Singlaub noted. Soldiers thus began randomly pillaging the occupied areas. Soon afterward, he recounted, it became a more organized operation, wherein the Soviet armed forces systematically stripped offices, factories and homes of any items deemed useful or desirable such as furniture, personal items and power generators.

When Singlaub arrived there in early 1946, he observed Soviet tanks with sofas strapped to them and saw ordinary soldiers wearing multiple wristwatches. He reported seeing several Red Army trucks loaded with looted goods. Japanese were also taken back to Russia, he noted. The looting was done very efficiently, said Singlaub adding, "it looked as if they had practice." The Soviets characterized these property seizures as ‘reparations’ - against an enemy that they had for less than a week, he remarked.

For their part, Singlaub recalled, the Soviets took "complete charge [and installed a] dedicated communist," Kim Il-Sung, who led a Korean division that first fought against the Japanese occupiers. [Thus began the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.] After WWII, Mao Zedong used these troops to assist in expelling the Nationalists [led by Chiang Kai-shek] from the Chinese mainland. This same division was then transferred back to Kim, added Singlaub, who later used it to invade South Korea in 1950.

A methodical buildup of Russian-made offensive weapons facilitated this long-planned attack, Singlaub explained, including heavy armor and artillery. Seeing this, local agents warned U.S. officials that some sort of military aggression was imminent. It still came as a surprise, the general continued, when it finally did occur. Truman then ordered General MacArthur to assist in the Republic of Korea’s defense. To the "great relief" of the American and South Korean ground forces, the newly created U.S. Air Force began striking the North Korean invader the next day.

MacArthur assembled a small task force to resist the attacks. Finding themselves fighting tanks with little more than shoulder weapons, U.S. and South Korean forces were driven from most of the country, Singlaub continued, retreating to a small perimeter in Pusan. This area was then used to bring in troops and materiel. Then Pusan was used to stage the now-famous amphibious attack at Inchon, which cut off the invader from the rear. Singlaub noted MacArthur’s "brilliant" timing of his attack with Inchon’s 30-foot tides, which at its ebb would expose miles of unnavigable mudflats.

Within weeks, Singlaub continued, U.S.-led forces pushed Kim Il-Sung’s army completely from the south and swept into North Korea, reaching the Yalu River [bordering China] in by October. [President Truman had already positioned the U.S. 7^th Fleet between China and Formosa ostensibly to protect the Nationalists, but it also served to free Mao’s troops to go elsewhere, namely North Korea.]

In November, 300, 000 Chinese then joined the fight. A small number of Soviet forces also participated, Singlaub added, mostly in the air. This pushed the U.S.-led forces as far back as below Seoul. [MacArthur directed a series of counter offensives that pushed the enemy out of South Korea by the end of February 1951. He was adamant that the bases the enemy used in China be attacked, denying them sanctuary. When refused, MacArthur made a series of public statements expressing his disagreement that led to his ouster in April.]

Singlaub added that [MacArthur’s successor, Gen. Matthew Ridgeway] initiated a "very successful" counter-offensive in May 1951, which penetrated deep into North Korea once again.

Continuing his narrative, Singlaub recounted that opposing forces eventually arrayed on a mostly stationary front slanting across the 38^th parallel. The North persisted in launching "heavy attacks" during this ‘cease-fire’ period, however. The communists were continually trying to seize positions that offered strategic and/or resource assets before any formal armistice was signed.

A major issue holding up negotiations was ‘voluntary repatriation.’ Singlaub explained that the American negotiators were adamant not to repeat being "snookered" as they were immediately following the Second World War. Having escaped from the Soviet Union, he said, soldiers and civilians alike were forcibly returned by the Allies only to be killed or sent to Siberia. This time, captured enemy soldiers were given the choice of staying in South Korea, going to Taiwan or returning to their home countries.

In July 1953, the combatant military commanders agreed to stop the fighting and established a Military Armistice Commission that would prevent further hostilities along a negotiated Demilitarized Zone. Singlaub emphasized that this was an arrangement between military commanders only. [No formal peace treaty has yet been signed to this day.]

Singlaub was asked why U.S. war aims changed from unconditional surrender for World War II to ‘containment’ in Korea and thereafter, thus leaving the aggressor regime and its sponsors in power. The general replied that during WWII, the Axis powers hoped that if they held out long enough that the Allies would sue for peace and they would be able to negotiate conditions. Germany and Japan fought harder given that unconditional surrender was demanded, Singlaub explained, but finally decided that surrender was better than the alternative.

Things were quiet until 1967, Singlaub said, when the North Koreans saw the heavy U.S. military involvement in Viet Nam as an opportunity to "start problems." Commandos were systematically inserted by such means as submarines, fishing boats and tunnels under the DMZ. Amongst their activities, the general continued, were five assassination attempts on the South Korean President [former general Park Chung Hee. Park’s wife was killed in one attempt in 1974. He was eventually assassinated in 1979 by his own intelligence chief. North Korean agents unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan 1983, but did kill 17 top South Korean government officials in the process.]

In 1968, Singlaub went on, the North Koreans seized the surveillance ship USS Pueblo in international waters, resulting in the death of one American. Fifteen months later an unarmed EC-121 surveillance aircraft was shot down, again over international waters, killing 31 crewmembers. Also beginning at this time, said Singlaub, North Korea initiated a massive military buildup of offensive weapons - doubling troops and tanks, tripling artillery pieces. These and other enhanced military assets were forward positioned "just north of the DMZ." An elaborate system of tunnels was also constructed. This was not discovered until 1975 after the U.S. withdrew major forces from South Korea, he added - surveillance photos existed prior, but were not reviewed.

Even after being apprised of the North Korean buildup however, Carter still insisted upon the U.S. force reduction in South Korea, Singlaub said. Carter did not allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the concept of a withdrawal itself. Instead, the general continued, they were given the choice of three withdrawal options: immediate/phased over a two-year period/phased over a five-year period. Singlaub recalled the JCS advising "all three [choices] were unsatisfactory," but the lesser of the evils would be the longer phase-out, "but it still involves grave risk for the ROK."

The JCS were further forbidden to consult with the people in the field. Singlaub added that he was not told this until the President summoned him back to Washington after a briefing he gave to a Japan-based Washington Post reporter. The U.S. ambassador wouldn’t allow reporters into the embassy or to talk to any of the U.S. Foreign Service personnel. Singlaub’s public affairs officer thus advised him to provide the reporter some background information about some upcoming negotiations. Otherwise the sole source of information would be some communist sympathizers who congregated around a cathedral in Seoul.

The White House told the media that Singlaub was being brought back for speaking out against the President’s decision. Back in Washington, the general said he reminded the Defense Secretary [Harold Brown] of a message "carrying his designation" that said a decision had not yet been taken. Consequently, he argued, he was "helping the decision-making process by providing the media details of the gut issues" involved. While this conversation took place, Singlaub later found, Brown’s public affairs representative was telling the press that the general had "deliberately defied" the Commander-In-Chief.

Both the Secretary of the Army and Brown advised Singlaub to tell the President that he’d been misquoted – that he really would support the withdrawal plan. Such a proposal angered the highly decorated two-star general, he recalled. "Mr. Secretary, you obviously don’t understand – I was VERY accurately quoted. I believed in what I said or I would have never said it!"

Singlaub was asked how he could have been expected to recant after what he had said was already recorded and published by a journalist. "These politicians don’t understand the granite foundations of the truth," he replied. "There is the truth and there are lies - to them it’s just spinning and all of the things that we now accept as..." he trailed off.

So Singlaub was forced to resign his commission - the second time an American general had been relieved of command for speaking out against military policy with respect to Korea. He was asked if there is a comparison with his circumstance and that of General MacArthur. "I think that it was important for Truman to listen to MacArthur," Singlaub began, "but he was in error once the decision was taken. He tried to ‘go over’ the President by asking the Congress to override his decision."

The security situation remained in a tense equilibrium until 1991, Singlaub explained, when the North Koreans unilaterally withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission [ostensibly because a South Korean general was appointed head of the UN delegation in March of that year]. Three years later, Singlaub continued, Pyongyang declared the original Armistice agreement itself null and void [seeking instead to fashion a direct bilateral agreement between North Korea and the U.S. as equals].

Singlaub offered that North Korea had been so clumsy and blatant in its violations that it would be "too embarrassing" to participate in the periodic multilateral talks that had been going on in Panmunjom since 1953. This is why today, the general added, that it has been difficult to trust in North Korea’s negotiating in good faith. The U.S. is eager to solve the problems presented by Pyongyang’s admission of an active and ongoing nuclear weapons program, Singlaub continued, which is in violation of a 1994 "agreed framework" [wherein a ‘light water’ nuclear reactor, petroleum and other economic aid would be provided to North Korea in exchange for abandoning pursuit of nuclear weapons].

The current North Korean position is there will be no adherence to any nuclear non-proliferation agreement unless America promises not to attack. The U.S. position has consistently been that all nuclear weapons must be removed from the Korean peninsula. America had removed its nuclear arsenal many years ago and have not allowed the South to attain one either, Singlaub noted.

Singlaub recounted a ‘hard-line’ position in which it is hoped that the six-way talks [between Russia, North Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S. and Japan] will collapse. Then a policy of isolating North Korea can ensue with the ultimate object being the current regime’s collapse. The alternative view is to peacefully ‘engage’ Pyongyang. Singlaub argued that this is "wishful thinking." North Korea is bound to add further major concessions (such as a significant unilateral U.S. troop reduction) beyond America promising not to launch a pre-emptive attack, he added.

The reason the U.S. is unwilling to make such a pledge is a long-standing pattern of North Korean bellicosity. "This guy [Kim Jong-Il] is crazy," Singlaub continued, "he’s liable to lash out without any consideration for his own people. ‘I owe it to my father [Kim Il-Sung]’" is one possible justification for an attack. Thus South Korea, Japan and the U.S. are being "held hostage" to North Korea’s nuclear potential. Singlaub noted that more than one-quarter of South Korea’s 40 million people live in Seoul, which is 26 miles from the border -- thus placing the capital within artillery range. He added that Japan received a shock [in November 1998] when North Korea launched a two-stage rocket that flew over Japanese airspace, landing in the ocean on the other side.

Japan in turn, Singlaub explained, will expect the U.S. to help develop its defensive capabilities. Some Japanese may advocate their own nuclear deterrent, he remarked. One thing that makes Singlaub confident that talks will continue is China’s announcement that in a recent six-way meeting, all present [stated that] they agreed to the desirability of a de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. When asked of the PRC’s motivations, he speculated that the Chinese recognize that South Korea is a "better asset" than North Korea. They’re getting great economic exchange with the South whereas the North is an "economic liability" to China. Beijing hopes that the negotiations will result in the U.S. providing the DPRK economic aid, the general added.